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HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS
On March  30-April  1, 2011 the U.S. 
Department of Homeland  Security, 
Science and Technology  Directorate 
(S&T), Office of University  Programs 
(OUP) hosted the  Fifth  Annual DHS 
University  Summit at the Washington, 
DC. Renaissance  Hotel. The  Summit 
t h e m e w a s  “ T r a n s p o r t a t i o n : 
Catastrophes  and Complex Systems”, 
and  provided  an  opportunity  to learn 
about cutting-edge  homeland  security 
science and  technology  research 
related to transportation systems.
C o n f e r e n c e  a t t e n d e e s  i n c l u d e d 
researchers  and  innovators  in 
academia, industry, and  government; 
chief scientists, program  analysts, 
portfolio managers, and other subject 
matter experts; federal, state, and 
municipal employees; first responders; 
DHS operators; and  academic 
institutions  associated with  the  twelve 
DHS-sponsored  research  Centers  of 
Excellence (COE) and their students.
As  part of the Summit, OUP invited 
student researchers  from  the DHS 
Centers  of Excellence to submit 
abstracts  on their projects. Presenters 
were  selected  by  DHS  subject matter 
experts  and invited  to participate  in 
the  Summit. The  papers  published in 
this  special supplement to Homeland 
Security  Affairs, which  summarize the 
work  presented  by  the  student 
participants, were recognized  for 
providing s ignif icant f indings, 
indications  and potentially  important 
contributions to the  homeland  security 
science and technology enterprise.
Vocal Analysis Software for Security Screening: 
Validity and Deception Detection Potential
Aaron C. Elkins, Judee Burgoon, and Jay Nunamaker
ABSTRACT
Our voices  are encoded with emotional 
information.  While it is complex and difficult 
to  develop software  to  classify  emotion and 
deception from the voice,  it is  possible. Using 
experimental methods, this  research 
examines  current commercial vocal analysis 
software for predictive  and statistical 
validity in identifying emotion and 
deception for security  screening.  It is 
unrealistic  to  rely  completely on the voice to 
detect deception and hostile intent for all 
people and all situations. But,  by exploring 
the vocal variables  used by the software,  we 
are able to  correspond and fuse them  with 
other detection technologies  for higher 
prediction reliability and accuracy. 
Implementing an unreliable and invalid 
detection technology could place the 
country’s  security in jeopardy by  failing to 
detect actual threats. Just as deleterious, 
however,  would be to dismiss technology, 
such as vocal analysis,  before  it has  been 
thoroughly examined. This  would deprive us 
of a valuable tool for detecting threats  and 
securing our homeland.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a  time when  a close friend or  parent 
spoke to you.  In  the case of your  parent,  you 
knew  immediately  if they  were angry  or 
happy  with  you  from  their  voice alone.  Your 
parent spoke louder,  faster,  and in  a  higher 
pitch  than  usual after  discovering  you  broke 
her  grandmother’s vase.  Contrast this with a 
close friend who recently  had a  death  in  his 
family.  He sounds depressed and speaks 
much  slower  and in  a  lower  volume then  an 
angry  parent.  With  the thoughts of their 
loved ones on their  mind people  would sound 
distracted,  with  shorter  responses and vocal 
interruptions.  As social  creatures, we can 
quickly  and automatically  determine 
emotional state or mood from the voice. 
Despite how  effortlessly  we can interpret 
emotion  and mood from  the voice, 
developing computer  software to replicate 
this feat  is exceedingly  difficult. Computers 
require very  specific  and predictable inputs 
and cannot  deal well  with  unbounded 
contexts and the chaot ic nature  of 
conversation.  We take for  granted how 
complex conversations are and how  quickly 
they  branch and weave back and forth 
between  topics and ideas. We even alternate 
between  moods and emotions in  just  one 
conversation, from  anger  when  recounting  a 
mean  boss to happiness when  discussing an 
upcoming birthday party. 
In addit ion  to the complexity  of 
conversation  contexts,  the science of 
measuring  and classifying  emotion and 
deception  using  the voice is in  its infancy. 
Fear,  for  instance, is characterized as fast 
speech  rate,  higher  mean  pitch, low  pitch 
variability, and lower voice quality. 1 However, 
the relationship between vocal measures and 
emotion  has not  been  well  explored beyond 
correlational analyses,  leading  to conflicting 
results and alternative vocal profiles for fear. 2 
Previous research  has found that  an 
increase in  the fundamental frequency  or 
pitch  is related to stress or  arousal. 3 Pitch  is a 
function of the speed of vibration  of the vocal 
chords during  speech  production.4  Females 
have smaller  vocal  chords than  men, 
requiring  their  vocal  chords to vibrate faster 
and leading to their  higher  perceived pitch. 
When we are aroused our  muscles tense and 
tighten.  When  the vocal muscles become 
tenser  they  vibrate at  a  higher  frequency, 
leading  to a  higher  pitch.  Similarly,  previous 
research  has found that  when  aroused or 
excited,  our pitch  also exhibits more variation 
and higher intensities. 5 
Deceptive speech  is also predicted to be 
more cognitively  taxing,  leading to non-
strategic  or  leakage cues. 6 These cues, specific 
to cognitive effort, can  be measured vocally. 
Cognitively-taxed speakers take longer  to 
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respond (response latency)  and incorporate 




Despite the complexity  of communication 
and the dearth of research in  classifying 
emotion  and deception  from  the voice, 
commercial software for  automatically 
detecting emotion, stress,  and deception  is 
being adopted for  use in  law  enforcement, 
fraud detection,  and rapid screening 
environments.7  Vocal  analysis software is 
appealing  because it  provides a  noncontact 
and inexpensive tool  for  rapid screening, 
requiring  only  a  computer  and microphone. 
However,  most  of the research on  vocal 
analysis software focused on  the older  Vocal 
Stress Analysis (VSA) technology  and not  the 
current full vocal spectrum systems. 
Investigations on modern  full spectrum 
vocal analysis software found it  unable to 
detect deception  above chance levels.8 
However,  all of this research  examined the lie 
or  truth classifications provided by  the 
software interface  and did not  “look under 
t h e h o o d ” a t  t h e u n d e r l y i n g v o c a l 
measurements provided by  the system  and 
examine their  validity  and classification 
potential.
STATE THE POTENTIAL SOLUTION AND 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research  investigates the  validity  and 
deception  and emotion  detection  ability  of 
commercial vocal analysis software using 
e x p e r i m e n t a l m e t h o d s .  A  s e r i e s o f 
experiments were conducted requiring 
participants to lie,  commit a  mock crime, and 
experience cognitive dissonance and stress. 
Participant’s voices from  each  experiment 
were recorded and submitted to modern 
vocal analysis software for  processing 9.  In 
addition to the classification  provided by  the 
software,  the raw  vocal variables were 
extracted from  the software and analyzed 
using  statistical  and machine learning 
methods.
Replicating  earlier  research  the vocal 
analysis software’s built-in  deception 
classifier  performed at  the chance level. 
However,  when  the vocal variables were 
analyzed independent of the software’s 
interface,  the variables documented to 
measure Stress,  Cognitive Effort,  and Fear 
significantly  differentiated between truth, 
deception,  stressful, and cognitive dissonance 
induced speech.
The results of a factor  analysis suggest the 
existence of stable latent  variables measuring 
Conflicting  Thoughts,  Thinking, Emotional 
Cognitive Effort,  and Emotional Fear.  A 
logistic  regression  model using  the vocal 
measurements for  predicting  deception 
outperformed machine learning classification 
approaches (Support  Vector  Machine and 
Decision  Tree) with  a  prediction  accuracy 
ranging from 46 percent to 62 percent.
Despite the discouraging  performance of 
commercial vocal analysis software’s built-in 
classification, the variables underlying these 
classifications hold promise for  predicting 
emotion  and deception  if properly  calibrated 
t o s p e c i f i c s c r e e n i n g  o r s e c u r i t y 
environments.
STATE THE END USERS/CUSTOMERS/
WHO WOULD BENEFIT 
Since 9/11,  the US Department of Homeland 
Security  (DHS) has been  seeking  to increase 
the country’s technological capability  to 
secure its borders and airports.  In  response 
to this need a  growing  community  of 
commercial security  technology  companies 
have emerged to service this niche industry. 
According  to CBP officials,  many  of these 
vendors are “selling  solutions in  search  of a 
problem.”  They  may  offer  “one-size-fits-all 
technologies” with  exciting  feature lists. 
However,  these systems depend on  specific 
operating  characteristics (e.g., polygraph 
style, rapid screening) and rely  on  single 
modalities (e.g., the voice). 
This research  investigates the potential of 
vocal analysis software to assist  DHS in 
securing  our borders and airports from 
threats.
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STATE THE CHALLENGES TO ATTAINING 
THE SOLUTION AND RESULTS
The vocal  analysis software vendors refute 
contradictory  findings by  arguing the built-in 
algorithms only  work  in  the real world where 
tension, stress, and consequences are high. 
Creating  these possibly  harmful  situations for 
experimental participants is not  feasible. To 
o v e r c o m e t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , c a r e f u l 
e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n  b a s e d o n 
communication  and social  psychology  theory 
must  be implemented to evoke emotions that 
occur  during  high  stakes lies,  without 
creating actual peril or harm. 
If strong  statistical  relationships between 
vocal analysis software variables and 
emotions are replicated, we must  try  and 
interpret a black box system.  The variables 
are calculated using propriety  algorithms and 
are not standard.  Research must  occur  in 
tandem  corresponding  these findings with 
standard phonetic  measurements (e.g.,  f0, 
intensity , pi tch  contours) to better 
understand the emotional vocal behavior. 
This will further  our  scientific  understanding 
and allow  us to better  calibrate vocal 
technology  for  specific security  screening 
contexts.
We must  be careful not  to over  rely  on  any 
one cue, vocal or  otherwise. People and 
deceitful or  truthful do not  all behave the 
same. Some people may  leak cues in  their 
voice while others do not.  Any  technology 
solution  implemented to observe and detect 
people should include multiple sensors.  For 
the person  that controls their  voice well, their 
pupils,  heart  rate, or  linguistic content  will 
betray their hostile intent. 
CONCLUSION 
This research  examines how  reliable and 
valid commercial vocal analysis software is 
for  predicting  emotion  and deception  in 
s e c u r i t y  s c r e e n i n g c o n t e x t s u s i n g 
experimental methods. While  research  exists 
that evaluates current vocal analysis 
software’s built-in  classifications, there is gap 
in  our  understanding  on  how  it may  actually 
perform in a real high stakes environment. 
Our  voices are encoded with  emotional 
information. While it  is complex  and difficult 
to develop software to classify  emotion  from 
the voice, it  is possible.  This research 
examines the variables produced by 
commercial  vocal analysis software for 
predictive potential  and statistical validity  in 
identifying  emotion  and deception.  It  is 
unrealistic to rely  completely  on  the voice to 
detect  deception and hostile intent  for all 
people and all  situations.  But, by  exploring 
the vocal  variables used by  the software,  we 
are able to correspond and fuse them  with 
other  detection  technologies for  higher 
prediction reliability and accuracy. 
Implementing  an unreliable and invalid 
detection technology  could place the 
country’s security  in  jeopardy  by  failing  to 
detect  actual threats. Just  as deleterious, 
however, would be to dismiss technology, 
such  as vocal  analysis,  before it  has been 
thoroughly  examined.  This would deprive 
DHS of a  valuable tool  for  detecting  threats 
and securing our homeland.  
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Vibration Based Damage Detections of Scour in Coastal Bridges 
Adel H. Elsaid and Rudolf Seracino
ABSTRACT
The ability to  ensure the  resiliency  and to 
predict the future performance of coastal 
bridges is  very dependent on identifying 
damages in critical components of the bridge 
rapidly after an event.  Traditional vibration 
based damage detection efforts  focused 
mainly on the detection of fatigue cracking. 
Although detecting fatigue cracking is 
i m p o r t a n t , i t d o e s  n o t c o n t r i b u t e 
significantly to the total number of bridge 
failures in the United States. A critical 
review  of the up-to-date literature showed 
that hydraulic  loading, including scour,  is 
responsible for about 50% of the failed 
bridges.  To this  end, the  primary focus  of 
this  project is  the development and 
evaluation of damage features  capable of 
rapidly identifying and quantifying the 
extent of deterioration of critical coastal 
bridge structures  due to scour at submerged 
piers  following extreme storm  events.  This 
paper illustrates the use of the curvature of 
horizontal mode shapes  and introduces  the 
“Modified Curvature Damage Factor.”
INTRODUCTION
In its latest  report, the National  Bridge 
Inventory  revealed that 603,168 bridges 
currently  exist  in  the United States.1  The 
Federal Highway  Administration (FHWA) 
rated 25  percent  of these bridges as 
“deficient.”  The American Association  of 
State Highway  and Transportation  Officials 
(AASHTO) announced in  their  2009  Bottom 
Line Report that  50 percent  of US bridges are 
more than  forty  years old without  sufficient 
information  on  their  current  condition. 2 And 
although  these represent 50 percent of the 
bridges,  they  are responsible for  80 percent 
of structural  deficiencies and about  75 
percent of total deficiencies.
Wardhana  and  Hadipriono collected 503 
cases of bridge failures that  occurred from 
1989  to 2000  in the United States.  They 
concluded that the dominant types of failed 
bridges are steel beam/girder  and steel truss 
bridges,  which  represent  50  percent of the 
total bridge failures. The next  significant 
cases involve failures of concrete beam/girder 
and concrete slab bridges, representing  11 
percent.  It  should be highlighted that the 
leading  cause of bridge failures are flood/
scour (48 percent). 3
Further, the visual inspection  of bridges 
regulated by  the FHWA  has limited 
capabilities in  detecting  all possible  damages 
in  bridges and there is the potential  to miss 
damage that  appears between inspection 
intervals. Based on  the current condition  of 
bridges,  the need for  global damage detection 
methods that can be applied to complex 
structures has led to the development  of 
methods that examine changes in  the 
vibration characteristics of the structure.
DISCUSSION
The primary  objective of this research  is to 
develop and evaluate a  rapid vibration-based 
damage detection (VBDD) technique capable 
of evaluating the condition  of a bridge 
following  an  extreme hydro-meteorological 
event. This technique relies on  the effect of 
scour  at  submerged piers on  the response of 
the bridge superstructure without  any 
underwater instrumentation.
RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE
Extreme natural hazards, particularly  hydro-
meteorological disasters,  are emerging  as a 
cause of major  concern  in  coastal regions. 
From  a  structural point  of view, hydraulic 
loading  due to flood and scour  is responsible 
for  about 50  percent  of the failed bridges in 
the United States. 4  Scour  failures tend to 
occur  suddenly  and without prior warning  or 
signs of distress to the structure.  The nature 
of the failure may  lead to collapse of the 
bridge. During  floods, the flowing  water 
tends to excavate pits in  front  of the 
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submerged bridge piers. As the velocity  of 
floodwater  decreases,  the suspended 
sediments precipitate and fill  the excavated 
pits.  Consequently,  following inspections and 
measures cannot  furnish  indications on  the 
maximum  depth  reached by  erosion  during 
flood. 5  Moreover,  the suspended sediments 
that  fill  the excavated pits do not provide 
good confinement for  the pile since they  are 
not as compacted as the rest of the soil. 
Therefore,  rapidly  assessing  the condition  of 
bridges after  an  event will inform  the 
decision  making  process in  the context  of 
assessing  evacuation  and first responders’ 
routes.  It should be mentioned that, after 
m e e t i n g  w i t h N C D O T  D i v i s i o n  3 
maintenance engineers,  the most reliable way 
to measure the level of scour  is by  underwater 
invest igat ion using  divers .  Further, 
underwater  investigations are performed 
once every  four years,  or  when  a  bridge is 
overtopped.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
VBDD techniques have shown  success in 
detecting several  types of damage, such  as 
fatigue cracking  in  steel beams. Since the 
primary  objective of this research is to 
develop a  damage detection  framework 
capable of rapidly  detecting critical damage 
of the superstructure as well  as scour,  VBDD 
techniques were selected to study  their 
sensitivity  for detecting  scour. For  this 
investigation, an idealized structure 
representing  a  two-span  continuous bridge 
was selected.  A  schematic of the idealized 
structure is shown  in  Figure 1. This steel grid 
was investigated previously  by  Catbas and 
others to study  the potential of two different 
damage-sensitive features for  damage 
detection.6 A  finite element  (FE) model  was 
created and verified by  the experimental 
results of Catbas,  et  al. After  verification of 
the modal analysis,  the model was modified 
to simulate an  idealized coastal bridge,  where 
the intermediate piles were modeled.  The 
abutments at  each  end were idealized with 
simple pin  and roller  supports. Six  FE models 
were created.  The first  model represented 
the reference case and the other  five models 
simulated five different  levels of scour.  Scour 
was modeled as an increase in the 
unsupported height of the intermediate piles.
Figure 1. Schematic of the Test Specimen7
The results of the modal  analysis were 
categorized according  to (1)  the vertically 
displaced mode shapes and (2)  the 
horizontally  displaced mode shapes. The 
dynamic characteristics of the vertically 
displaced mode shapes were insensitive to 
scour.  This set of dynamic  characteristics 
could be used to assess damages in  the 
superstructure as investigated by  previous 
researchers. Conversely, the dynamic 
characteristics of the horizontally  displaced 
mode shapes showed significant  changes due 
to scour.  From  the natural  frequencies of the 
horizontally  displaced mode shapes, it  could 
be concluded that  as the pile height  increases, 
the natural frequency  decreases. This is 
attributed to the decrease in  the flexural 
stiffness of the intermediate support and 
leads to the hypothesis that the natural 
frequencies may  be used to quantify  the level 
of scour.
By  calculating the change in  the curvature 
of the horizontally  displaced mode shapes, 
the location  of damage at  the intermediate 
pile was detected.   To summarize the change 
in  the curvature for  a  group of mode shapes, 
Abdelwahab and De Roeck introduced the 
Curvature Damage Factor (CDF) as
  (1)
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where N is the total number  of modes to be 
considered, νo”  is the curvature mode shape 
of the reference structure and νd”  is that of 
the damaged structure. 8  By  calculating  the 
CDF for  the first  five horizontally  displaced 
mode shapes,  the location  of damage at the 
intermediate support  was captured. 
However,  as shown  in  Figure 2a, the CDF 
also identified four  potential false positives. 
This may  be attributed to the high  order 
mode shapes that  do not contribute in  the 
damage identification.  A threshold is typically 
used,  based on  a statistical analysis of the 
CDF values,  to discriminate between  the true 
locations of damage and false  positives, as 
given  by  the horizontal lines in  Figure 2. To 
normalize the effect  of the higher  order  mode 
shapes, a  Modified Curvature Damage Factor 
(MCDF) was introduced as follows
  (2)
where the MCDF calculates the average of the 
absolute ratio of the curvature change for  a 
certain number  of mode shapes.  From  Figure 



























Figure 2. (a) CDF and (b) MCDF for the Idealized 
Structure at 40 inches of Scour.
By  calculating the CDF and MCDF for  the 
first  five horizontally  displaced mode shapes 
it  was observed that  the CDF and MCDF 
decreases as the  scour level  increases as 
shown in  Figure 3.  Therefore, the CDF and 
MCDF may  be used not  only  to locate scour 
but also to quantify  the amount  of scour, 
which  would be required to quantify  the 
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Figure 3. (a) CDF and (b) MCDF Calculated at 
Different Scour Levels
BENEFITS OF THE RESEARCH PRODUCTS
The end users of the technologies that  will 
ultimately  result  from  this research  project 
will be technical  in nature such  as local/state 
bridge engineers or  engineering consultants. 
It is anticipated that once the outcomes of 
this research  project  are successfully 
demonstrated in  field applications that  “plug-
and-play  black  box”  instrumentation 
p a c k a g e s w i l l  b e  d e v e l o p e d a n d 
manufactured by  others for this application. 
These kits would automatically  collect  and 
manipulate the raw  data so that  the 
prediction  of the remaining  strength  or 
endurance is possible. The output  of which 
will be  used to inform  agencies such  as the 
Federal Emergency  Management  Agency 
(FEMA) to make informal decisions 
regarding  relief efforts. Further, the 
developed framework  can serve as a  template 
for  other critical infrastructure enhancing  the 
resilience of communities.
ONGOING RESEARCH TASKS
The main  difference between the investigated 
idealized structure and a  real bridge is the 
presence of a  concrete deck. To study  the 
effect  of the stiffness of the concrete deck on 
the horizontally  displaced mode shapes for 
the detection  of scour,  a  FE model for  the 
Chicken  Road Bridge in  Lumberton,  NC, was 
created. The FE model  was verified by 
experimental work performed by  previous 
researchers. 9  After  verification, three more 
FE models were created to simulate three 
different levels of scour. The differences in 
mode shape curvatures were calculated for 
the horizontally  displaced mode shapes. It 
should be mentioned that  the FE results 
showed the same conclusions as the idealized 
structure models.
Having  verified the proposed technique 
numerically,  on-going efforts are dedicated to 
laboratory  testing  of an idealized structure 
(similar  to that shown  in  Figure 1) and 
preparations for  long-term  field applications 
in  collaboration  with  NCDOT Division  3 
engineers.  These tests will  be used to evaluate 
the robustness of the technique allowing for 
the complexities,  such  as environmental 
conditions,  not  easily  accounted for in 
numerical simulations.
CONCLUSION
Based on  the findings of the current  study, 
the following conclusions may be drawn:
1. Hydraulic loading due to flood and 
scour  is the main cause of bridge 
failure in the United States.
2. Underwater  assessment of scour  after 
f lood is of l i t t le s ignif icance, 
particularly  in the context of assessing 
the remaining  strength  or  endurance 
of the structure.   This may  be 
attributed to the precipitation  of the 
suspended sediments in the scour 
pits.
3. The dynamic characteristics of coastal 
bridges can be divided into two 
categories: (1) vertically  displaced 
mode shapes; and (2) horizontally 
displaced mode shapes.
4. The curvature of the horizontally 
displaced mode shapes is sensitive to 
scour,  which  to the best of authors’ 
knowledge has not been  considered in 
such an application before.
5. The “Modified Curvature Damage 
Factor”  is proposed as a  damage 
indicator  with  the potential to also 
quantify  the extent of scour necessary 
to quantify the remaining strength.
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Decision Learning Algorithm for Acoustic Vessel Classification 
Talmor Meir, Mikhail Tsionskiy, Dr. Alexander Sutin, Dr. Hady Salloum
ABSTRACT
Detection,  tracking and classifying vessels  of 
all sizes  approaching ports  and harbors is 
an imperative aspect to the security of 
complex maritime systems.  This  case study 
is an application of the passive acoustic 
method for vessel classification. The analysis 
of noise  radiated by passing boats  in Hudson 
River provides sound signatures and specific 
acoustic  features  of various  boats.  The 
features  are then implemented into  a 
decision-making algorithm  used for final 
classification.
INTRODUCTION
Marine transportation plays a  vital role in the 
global economic  viability  of the United States. 
As a  maritime nation,  the United States 
depends on  a strong  commercial maritime 
industry  that  is tied to maritime security  and 
i t s s t a b i l i t y .  P o r t s a n d a f f i l i a t e d 
transportation  are all  part of a  complex 
system  and are potential targets,  with wide-
scale disaster implications. A  need to detect, 
track and classify  vessels of all sizes 
approaching  our  ports and harbors is 
imperative to the security  of this country  and 
its complex maritime systems. This case 
study  is an  application  of the passive acoustic 
method for  vessel classification.  The 
complexity  of the classification  problem  is 
approached using  acoustic signature analysis. 
Prior  studies at Stevens Institute of 
Technology  found that reliable  results can  be 
obtained based on  signal frequency  analysis, 
specifically,  some of the most useful signal 
characteristics are found in  the signal’s 
envelope spectrum. Detection  of Envelope 
Modulation on  Noise (DEMON) tool is used 
in  this case study  to analyze the acoustic 
signatures of various vessel types and to 
provide for  specific features that  are later 
implemented into a decision  algorithm, 
which determines the final classification.
BACKGROUND
ACOUSTICS
Acoustics involves the study  of the 
production,  propagation, and reception  of 
sound.  As sound travels through  water,  the 
w a v e s a t t e n u a t e ,  w h i c h  e n a b l e 
instrumentation  to record the changes and 
a s s o c i a t e t h e m  w i t h  v e s s e l n o i s e 
characteristics. The main  sources of noise 
generated by  a  marine vessel are (1) 
mechanical noise of the main  engine and 
auxiliary  machine, (2) propeller  cavitations 
noise,  and (3)  hydrodynamic  noise of the 
moving vessel. 1  The acoustic signature 
produced by  the radiating  noise consists of a 
continuous broadband spectrum  and line 
spectrum.  It  is the specific  configuration  of 
the narrow  band frequencies that  helps 
classify and identify different classes of vessels.
CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS- 
DECISION TREE 
The classification  objective is to identify 
vessels (ferry,  speed boat,  sail boat  etc) based 
on  a  training set of acoustic signatures whose 
group-label is previously  known and then be 
able to embrace any  new  observation. The 
general  process of classification  is placing 
individual vessels into groups labeled based 
on  quantitative information  of their 
attributes. Attributes are: an  in-depth  and 
structured set  of categories that  are usually 
denoted by  a  numerical code.  In  essence, the 
attributes are the preparation  for  the 
classification  algorithm  construction.  A  wide 
range of classification algorithms has been 
studied in  various fields, some of which  have 
been  appl ied to acoust ic s ignature 
classification.  Common classification 
algorithms mentioned in  acoustics studies 
are: neural networks,  K-nearest  neighbors, 
Gaussian,  and decision tree.  Due to its 
simplicity  and ability  to handle a  mix  type 
data  set,  the decision  tree model was chosen 
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as the classification algorithm  for  this case 
study.  The decision tree uses relative entropy 
or  Kullback-Leibler  (KL)  to study  the contrast 
between  two or  more probability  vectors. 
This approach  sprung  from  information 
theory.2 A  typical decision  tree encodes in  a 
form  of tree, where data  passes through 
branch  like nodes,  constructed from  the 
attributes-rule mentioned earlier  and 
eventually  flows through  to the final leafs 
representing  the group label (ferry,  sail boat, 
speed boat etc).  The node selection  is 
accomplished by  selecting  the attribute that 
divides the inhomogeneous data into 
minimal inhomogeneous subsets using 




Stevens Passive Acoustic  Detection  System  is 
composed of four  ITC-6050C hydrophones 
manufactured by  International Transducer 
Corporation  and connected to an  underwater 
computer,  which  communicates and feeds 
acoustical information (both  acquisition  and 
analysis)  into the control room  of the 
Maritime Security  Laboratory  (MSL) at 
Stevens Institute of Technology (figure 1a).!
(a)
(b)
Figure 1. (a) picture of the system of the deck of 
RV Savitsky prepared for deployment and view of 
the test site (b) with hydrophone position shown 
by red circle.
This deployment of the acoustic system 
was initiated in  part  at the Summer  Research 
Institute program  of Stevens University, July 
2010.  The underwater  computer  and 
hydrophones were dropped into the Hudson 
River  approximately  300  ft off the Hoboken 
NJ shore (Fig.1b.).  The database collected 
during  the summer of 2010  is composed of 
acoustical events of approximately  950 ships 
accompanied by  pictures,  video and a  manual 
log record of environmental conditions.
DATA PROCESSING
The task of marine vessel tracking  and 
signature extraction  is achieved by  using 
cross-correlation  processing  of acoustic 
signals that  are detected off four  underwater 
hydrophones.  As the vessel  noise radiates 
through  the water ,  i t  reaches each 
hydrophone at a  different  time. The time 
delay  between  the hydrophones is the 
determining factor  that allows the system  to 
detect the direction of the moving vessel. 
We applied DEMON (Detection of 
Envelope Modulation on  Noise) analysis; for 
ship classification  as it  is one of the most 
reliable acoustic  means for ship noise 
detection  and classifications. 3  The noise 
radiated by  a  ship is modulated at a rate 
dictated by  parameters of the propeller  and 
engine (number  of blades and rotational 
speed). Evaluation  of that  modulation helps 
provide information  on  the ship, such as the 
shaft rotation  frequency, that  can  be used for 
ship classification.  Stevens has developed 
software for measurements of the vessel 
modulation  spectra.  DEMON analysis 
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construct ion  involves the fo l lowing 
algorithm: 
1. Measured signal  is divided into parts of 
1/1000 of a  second.  In  our  case, since the 
signals were measured at 200  kSamples/
sec these parts contain 200  measured 
points.
2. At each  part, the measured samples are 
squared,  mean  value of the results is 
calculated, and then square root of the 
result  is computed. Hence out  of initial 
200  points in  each  signal part  we have 
received 1 point for further analysis.
3. Some predefined number  (e.g.  2048)  of 
these new  calculated subsequent  points is 
collected; their  mean  value is calculated 
and then  subtracted from  initial points. 
The results are analyzed using  FFT Power 
Spectrum. 
4. Steps 1-3  are repeated for  the rest of the 
measured signals.
RESULTS
Examples of the recorded DEMON spectra 
for  several  boats are presented in  Figures 2 
and 3.
Figure 2. DEMON spectra of various vessels recorded in the Hudson River.
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Based on  the acoustic signature analysis, 
the following  table provides the attributes 
and their  associated splitting  sub-populations 








2-3 peaks The number of 
line spectrum 







10-14 Hz The frequency 







14-41 Hz The range of 
the last peaked 











Table 1. Attributes description and subpopulation 
values
An example of the attributes extraction  of 
Ferry  A and Ferry  B is shown  in Figure 3  and 
their  attributes values are  shown  in  the Table 
2.  These  observation models allow  the 
classification algorithm  to separate and 
therefore identify  the ferries from  each other 
and from all other vessels in the water.
!"##$%&
!"##$%'
Figure 3. Illustration of the selection diagram for 
two types of ferries.
Type # of peaks Main Freq Max Freq range Amplitude ratio
Ferry A 3 ~11 Hz 20-40 Hz 2<x<4
Ferry B 4 ~ 41 Hz <130 Hz 2<x<4
Table 2. Attributes values for Ferry A and Ferry B
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T h e f o l l o w i n g  d e c i s i o n t r e e w a s 
constructed from  the DEMON signatures of 
twenty  recorded boat sounds based on  the 
c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e d e g r e e o f 
homogeneousness of the three group labels 
Ferry A, Ferry B, and Not ferry.
CONCLUSION 
This case study  has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of utilizing DEMON acoustic 
signatures for  boat  identification. Attributes 
for  classification were extracted from  the boat 
signatures and the simplified decision  tree 
was built.  Future work  is needed in 
maintaining  a catalog  for  acoustic signatures; 
developing a  library  of few  hundred boat 
signatures will  allow  for more accurate 
classification of vessels. 
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Optimal Defensive Allocations in the Face of Uncertain Terrorist 
Preferences, with an Emphasis on Transportation 
Chen Wang and Vicki M. Bier
ABSTRACT
This paper extends a game-theoretic model 
for identifying optimal defensive resource 
allocations to  the case of realistic  multi-
attribute terrorist objective functions. In 
particular,  we compare the  optimal 
defensive resource allocations to  ten major 
US urban areas in the face of uncertain 
terrorist preferences  with and without 
transportation-related attributes. The 
defender’s  uncertainty about terrorist 
preferences is  addressed both by probability 
distributions over the attacker’s attribute 
weights,  and by allowing for attributes  that 
are important to  the attacker but not known 
to  the defender.  Estimates of the various 
terrorist attribute weights are inferred from 
(partial) ordinal expert judgments using the 
technique of probabilistic inversion.
INTRODUCTION
Allocating  a  limited budget  to protect 
potential targets against terrorist  attackers is 
an  important  but  difficult  task.  In  doing  so, 
we must  take into account  both  the strategic 
nature of the attackers,  and also the 
defender’s uncertain  knowledge about 
attacker preferences. A variety  of game-
theoretic models in  the face of defender 
uncertainty have been studied and applied. 1
This study  is based on  the sequential  game 
with  incomplete information  developed by 
Bier  et al. 2 In that  model,  the defender  moves 
first  to allocate her  defensive resources 
among  the potential  targets under  uncertain 
knowledge about  attacker  preferences; the 
attacker  then  selects the target  with the 
highest  payoff to attack,  in  light  of any 
defensive investments.3  Knowing  or 
assuming  that the attacker  would play  his 
best response to any  given  defensive 
allocation,  the defender  wishes to choose her 
allocation so as to effectively  protect against 
attacks, deter  attacks,  or  deflect  attacks to 
less important  targets. However,  with 
uncertainty  about  the attacker’s utility 
function,  the defender  cannot  predict  the 
attacker’s best  response for  sure; therefore, 
the defender  is assumed to minimize her 
expected total loss (where the defender 
objectives may  in  general  be different  from 
the attacker objectives).
This paper  extends the above game-
theoretic model for  determining  optimal 
defensive resource allocations to the case of 
more realistic multi-attribute terrorist 
objective functions.  In particular,  we 
compare the optimal defensive  resource 
allocations in the face of uncertain  terrorist 
preferences with  and without transportation-
related attributes. The defender’s uncertainty 
about  terrorist preferences is represented 
both  by  probability  distributions over  the 
attacker’s attribute weights, and by  allowing 
for  attributes that  are important  to the 
attacker but not known to the defender. 
One closely  related task  is to elicit the 
attacker  attribute weights in  the terrorist 
multi-attribute objective from  the judgments 
of intelligence experts.  However, direct 
estimation  of attribute  weights can  be 
difficult, since intelligence analysts are 
usually  not  familiar  with  utility  theory,  and 
historical data  about  terrorist  attacks are 
relatively  sparse.  In  such  cases,  indirect 
elicitation  may  be preferable.  In  particular, 
this paper  uses an  approach  in  which  experts 
are asked to give (partial) rank orderings of 
attack  strategies or  targets, and the attribute 
weights in  the attacker  objective function  are 
then  inferred from  those partial rankings 
using  probabilistic inversion. 4  We believe 
that this approach  will increase the 
acceptance of quantitative methods by 
intelligence experts, and also make it  possible 
to elicit  the opinions of a  large number  of 
experts in  an  automated (e.g.,  online) 
manner. 
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MODEL
As in  Wang and Bier,5  we assume that  the 
defender’s objective is to minimize the total 
expected loss, as given by
 
!"#!!! !!! !! !!!! ! !! ! !! !!!!!! !"#! !!!" !!
!
!!! ! ! 
where:
• n = number of targets
• ci= defender’s resource allocation to 
target i
• B = defender’s total budget
• vi = defender’s valuation of target i
• hi(c1,...,cn)  = probability  of an  attack 
on target i
• p(ci)  = 
 
!!!!!  = = success probability  of 
an  attack  on target  i,  as a  function of 
the budget allocated to target i, where 
λ is the cost  effectiveness of defensive 
investment.6  
The attacker  is then  assumed to observe the 
defender’s resource allocations ci and then 
choose the target  with  the highest payoff in 
light of any defensive investment: 
 
!"#!    p(ci)Ui
where:
• Ui = 
 
!!!!!!!!   
 
 uj(Aij)xj + eixm = 
attacker’s utility of target i
• xj= attacker  weight  on  attribute j(xj ≥ 
0, j=1, ... , m, and 
 




• Aij = attacker  rating  of target  i on 
attribute j(j=1, ... , m - 1)
• uj= single-attribute utility  function  for 
attribute , taking on values in [0, 1]. 
• εi = attacker  utility  of target i on  the 
unobserved attribute (modeled as 
independent,  identically  uniformly 
distributed random  variables taking 
on values in [0, 1]).
Experts are asked to give partial rank 
orderings of the various possible attacker 
targets or  strategies (e.g.,  the top five and 
bottom  five).   The probability  distributions of 
the various attribute weights  are then 
estimated using probabilistic inversion.7 
CASE STUDY
We conduct a  case study  on  the ten major  US 
urban  areas with  the highest expected 
damage from  terrorism, 8  based on  two 
different sets of attributes: “macro”  attributes 
(expected property  losses from  terrorism, and 
total population);9 and transportation-related 
attributes (yearly  air  departures,  and average 
daily  bridge traffic  on  the most heavily 
traveled bridge).10  The ten  urban areas are: 
New  York City  (NYC); Chicago; San 
Francisco; Washington,  DC; Los Angeles 
(LA); Philadelphia; Boston; Houston; 
Newark; and Seattle.  The attribute values for 
these ten urban areas are presented in  Table 
1. 
Urban Area
Expected Property Loss 
from Terrorism 
($ million)
Population Yearly Air Departures
Average Daily 
Bridge Traffic
 NYC 413 9,314,235 23,599 596,400
 Chicago 115 8,272,768 39,949 318,800
 San Francisco  57 1,731,183 19,142 277,700
 Washington, 
DC 36 4,923,153 17,253 254,975
 LA 34 9,519,338 28,816 336,000
 Philadelphia 21 5,100,931 13,640 192,204
Boston 18 3,406,829 11,625 669,000
 Houston  11 4,177,646 20,979 308,060
 Newark 7.3 2,032,989 12,827 518,100
 Seattle 6.7 2,414,616 13,578 212,000
Table 1. Attribute values for the ten urban areas with the highest expected terrorism losses.
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We consider  two hypothetical experts who 
give partial  rank  orderings of these urban 
areas.  In  particular, Expert 1  ranks NYC, 
Chicago,  LA,  San  Francisco, and DC as the 
top five most attractive cities (in  that  order), 
and Houston  at the bottom; Expert  2  ranks 
Chicago,  LA,  NYC, Houston, and Boston as 
the top five cities (in that order), and 
Philadelphia at the bottom.
For  this case study,  we assume that the 
attacker’s single-attribute utility  function  for 
attribute  j(j = 1, ...  ,  m  - 1),  uj(Akj) is 
proportional to ln
 
!!!"!! !  (where aj = miniAij), 
and hence measures how  much  more 
attractive target  k  is than  the least  desirable 
target  on attribute j.  They  are normalized so 
that  uj(Akj) = 1  when  target  k  is the most 
attractive target on  attribute j.  This choice of 
utility  function  is also consistent with 
Fechner’s law, which  states that human 
perceptions are  typically  logarithmic in  the 
magnitude of the original stimuli. 11  For 
example,  if the expected property  loss in 
Chicago is doubled from  115  to 230  million 
dollars, the attacker’s single-attribute utility 
increases by  an addit ive increment 
proportional to ln(2). 
The histograms in  Figure 1  show  the 
probability  distributions for  the attacker 
attribute weights inferred from  the rankings 
of expert 1, with  and without transportation-
related attributes.  Including transportation-
related attributes reduces the expected 
weight  on  the unobserved attribute from  31 
percent  to 24  percent. However,  the weight 
on  the unobserved attribute is sti l l 
substantial, reflecting  the fact that  the 
rankings given  by  Expert  1  do not  place a  lot 
of importance on  air  departures and bridge 
traffic. 
Figure 1. Attribute weights inferred from the rankings of Expert 1.
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The optimal defensive  resource allocations 
based on  the elicited attribute weights from 
Expert  1  are shown  in  Figure 2. Note that San 
Francisco is rated higher  than  DC both  by 
Expert  1,  and on  the defender  objective 
function (property  loss). However,  as shown 
in  Figure 2a, when  using only  the two macro 
attributes, DC  gets more resources than San 
Francisco, reflecting  the fact that the model 
does not have enough  information  to 
distinguish  clearly  between San  Francisco 
and DC. Including the transportation-related 
attributes allows the model  to perform  better 
in  this regard,  as shown by  the reversed 
ranking  of San  Francisco and DC in  Figure 
2b.
Figure 2. Optimal defensive allocations based on elicited attribute weights from Expert 1.
Figures 3  and 4  give comparable results 
for  hypothetical  Expert 2.  Figure 3a shows 
that  wi thout  t ransportat ion-re la ted 
attributes, the model  puts 40  percent  of the 
weight  on  the unobserved attribute, 
indicating that the macro attributes are not 
sufficient to adequately  represent  the beliefs 
of Expert 2.  By  contrast,  Figure 3b shows 
that the ratings given  by  Expert 2  are 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h  a  h i g h  w e i g h t o n 
transportation-related attributes.   As a  result, 
the weight on the unobserved attribute drops 
to only 18 percent.
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Figure 3. Attribute weights inferred from the rankings of Expert 2.
Using  only  macro attributes also performs 
poorly  for  the optimal  defensive allocations 
resulting  from  the judgments of Expert 2, 
since the expert’s target rankings (Chicago, 
LA, NYC, Houston, and Boston  as the top five 
cities, and Philadelphia  at  the bottom) reflect 
high  weights on  transportation-related 
attributes.  For  example, Houston is ranked 
fourth  in  air  departures,  but receives only 
modest  funding  in  Figure 4a; by  contrast, 
Philadelphia  is ranked seventh  in  air 
departures and tenth in  bridge traffic,  but 
receives relatively  high  levels of funding  in 
Figure 4a, because of its large population. 
With  the inclusion  of transportation-related 
attributes, the model  does a  much  better  job 
of matching  the stated rankings given by 
Expert 2, as shown in Figure 4b.
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Figure 4. Optimal defensive allocations based on elicited attribute weights from Expert 2
CONCLUSION
Intelligence analysts are sometimes unable or 
unwilling to provide quantitative risk 
estimates.12  This paper  bridges this gap by 
providing a practical and methodologically 
credible way  for  risk analysts to obtain 
quantitative risk  estimates from  ordinal 
rankings provided by  intelligence analysts. In 
particular,  if experts find it  difficult to 
estimate attacker  attribute weights, indirect 
elicitation  based on  (partial)  rank  ordering  of 
attack  targets or  strategies can help ease  the 
elicitation burden.  We believe that this 
approach  will increase the acceptance of 
quantitative approaches by  intelligence 
experts,  and increase the number  of experts 
whose opinions can  be elicited in  an 
automated (e.g., online) manner. 
In  addition, the inclusion of unobserved 
attributes makes it possible to use our  model 
in  a  diagnostic manner,  to indicate  whether 
we have enough attributes.  Finally, the 
results presented here (based on  hypothetical 
expert  judgments)  show  that  including 
transportation-related attributes can  help to 
distinguish  between  targets,  especially  when 
an  expert believes that the attacker  puts high 
weight  on transportation-related attack 
strategies.
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Consequence Assessment for Complex Food Transportation 
Systems Facing Catastrophic Disruptions
Yu Zhang and Alan Erera
ABSTRACT
This white paper describes  our research on 
vulnerability assessment for complex 
transportation system facing catastrophic 
disruptions. The proposed methods  attempt 
to understand the consequences  of 
disruptions  to major freight transportation 
systems,  where the consequences are 
measured here in the limited sense of 
increased supply chain costs.  A case  study 
applying the  ideas  to  the US corn export 
supply chain is  provided.  The paper explains 
how  the dataset for the corn network  is 
constructed from  public  data sources and 
presents  the results  of an example 
assessment,  focusing on a set of dams  and 
locks on the Mississippi River System.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is one of the largest  grain 
producers and top grain  exporting  countries 
in  the world.  For  the three primary  export 
field crops – corn,  wheat and soybean  – total 
exports in  2007  measured 110 million  metric 
tons (mmt) with  a  total value of $13-17 
billion.1  On the basis of value alone, the 
revenue from  grain exports is critical to the 
economic  health  of US grain  producers and 
related industries.
Export flows for  grains rely  on  three 
freight  transport  modes – truck,  railroad and 
inland water  – while moving  through  the 
mainland US en  route to an export port. 
From  the export port, the grains are shipped 
to destination countries by  bulk ocean  vessel, 
with  the exception  of exports to Mexico and 
Canada.  In  this paper, we focus on the 
domestic long-haul  segment  of the grain 
export  transportation  chain, i.e.,  the  portion 
of transportation  conducted by  railroad and 
barge.
Currently,  the US grain  export  supply 
chain  faces large challenges due primarily  to 
enormous freight volume and relatively  tight 
transport  capacity. Moreover, the supply 
chain  is often affected by  various disruptions, 
arising  from  natural hazards, some recent 
examples of which  have been  catastrophic. 
For  example, Hurricane Katrina hit  the Gulf 
of Mexico in  2005, resulting in a major 
disruption to grain  transportation. Barge and 
rail traffic was slowed, because of serious 
damage to transportation  facilities and 
displacement of employees. 2 
Our  research  aims to identify  and 
determine how  to understand the potentially 
severe supply  chain  cost risks present in 
complex transportation systems supporting 
US food supply  chains,  with  the intent  of 
enabling significant improvement  in  food 
supply  chain  security,  preparedness and 
resiliency. Models are developed to assess the 
vulnerability  of critical  infrastructure and key 
resources (CI/KR) in  the transportation 
system,  where vulnerability  in  this case is 
measured by  the potential for  large supply 
chain  cost  increases given disruption. 
Understanding  vulnerabilities in  the system 
is important  for  the effective allocation  of 
protection investment.
TECHNICAL DETAILS: MODEL 
AND DATA COLLECTION
CONSTRUCTION OF GRAIN EXPORT 
SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK
The grain  export  supply  chain  is modeled as a 
network. Each  node in  the network 
represents a Business Economic Area (BEA) 
in  the United States.3  Transport routes 
between  nodes, mainly  railroads and inland 
waterways,  are modeled as arcs. Critical 
infrastructure in the transportation  system, 
such  as locks and dams on  rivers, are 
included in  this set of arcs.  The goal  of the 
network model is to predict  how  grain  flows 
will move between  production sources and 
export  ports,  given the relative costs and 
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capacities of the underlying  transportation 
infrastructure.   In  this initial research, we 
assume that  costs can be modeled as linear  in 
total freight  flow  along arcs,  but that  arcs 
have limited capacity  for flow.  When  arc 
capacities are reduced due to a disruption, 
such  a model can  be used to predict  how 
freight  will be move post-disruption,  and 
provide a measure  of potential supply  chain 
cost  impact. The resulting  optimization 
problem  is a  Minimum  Cost  Flow  (MCF) 
problem, which  can be solved efficiently.4 
System  behavior  over  time can  be simulated 
by  using  a  time-space network,  an  expansion 
of the static network over  the time horizon. 
Figure 1  illustrates a  sample network and its 
time-space version.5 
Figure 1. A Sample Network
DATA COLLECTION
Our  vulnerability  assessment  methodology  is 
applied to the US corn  export  supply  chain. 
Figure 2  shows an overview  of the 
transportation  network for  exporting corn. 
Corn is mainly  grown  in  the “Corn  Belt,'' the 
dark green  region  in this figure.  The primary 
destinations of export flows within  the US are 
the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific-northwest 
(PNW). Corn is shipped to New  Orleans by 
barge and railroad and shipped to PNW by 
railroad.  Barge is preferred if available 
because of its lower cost.
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Figure 2. Map of Corn Export Supply Chain
All  data for  our example case study  was 
collected from  public sources, such  as the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA),  The US 
Department of Transportation  (USDOT),  and 
the US Army  Corps of Engineers (USACE). 
Technically, the data  is collected separately 
for  the two modes: inland water  and railroad. 
In  the inland water  sub-network, each node 
represents a Business Economic Area (BEA) 
along  the Mississippi River System.6  Arcs 
connect two BEA along  the rivers.  Locks and 
dams limit  the capacity  of corresponding 
arcs.  The inland water  data  was obtained 
primarily  from  the Grain  Transportation 
Report  (GTR).7  In  the railroad sub-network, 
each  BEA  is again  represented by  one node. 
Ninety-one BEA  that  have rail transportation 
activities related to corn  export are involved, 
as determined from  the Public Use Waybill 
(2007).8 The two sub-networks are connected 
b y  a r c s r e p r e s e n t i n g  i n t e r m o d a l 
transportations between  proper  nodes. 
Supply  and demand in  the network are also 
determined from the GTR.9
MODELING DISRUPTIONS
A  disruption  can be modeled as reduction of 
arc capacity  in  the network.  The general 
disruption-recovery  process,  illustrated in 
Figure 3,  can also be modeled in  time-space 
network.  In  this figure,  the affected 
component  is disrupted at  the time 
“disruption  point.”  As the magnitude of 
disruption  increases, the capacity  of the 
a f f e c t e d a r c d r o p s t o m i n i m u m . 
Subsequently,  the effect  of disruption 
diminishes and the arc capacity  recovers 
slowly  to the normal state at  the time “back-
to-normal point''.
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Figure 3. General Recovery Process and MCF Model with Disruption
F i g u r e 3  a l s o p r o v i d e s a s i m p l e 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l 
optimization  problem  given  a  disruption.  The 
notation  used is standard MCF notation. 10 
Additionally,  θ represents the maximum 
magnitude of the disruption  and  reflects the 
relative effect that disruption  exerts on arc 
(i,j).
The relationship between  total  supply 
chain  cost  and magnitude of disruption 
reflects the impact  of disruption  to the 
system.  It  is described by  a  so-called Impact 
Curve.  We prove that the impact  curve 
resulting from  our  model  is a  convex, 
piecewise linear,  non-decreasing  function  of 
disruption magnitude, illustrated in  Figure 4. 
Given the impact curves of all network 
components, their  vulnerability  can  be 
compared.  But the vulnerability  of one 
component  may  not  dominate that  of 
another,  as shown  in  the right part  of Figure 
4, where component 1  is more vulnerable to 
smaller  disruptions,  but  component  2 
becomes more vulnerable as the disruptions 
grow larger.
Figure 4. Impact Curves
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VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT ALGORITHM
An impact curve can be determined by  a 
series of breakpoints and slopes between  two 
breakpoints.  Based on the observation, the 
Dual Network Simplex Algorithm  is 
used to determine the impact curves for  a 
selection of arcs in  a  network.11 An outline of 
the procedure is as follows:
• Start  from  the optimal flow  x  of the 
nominal problem  with  no disrupted 
arcs;
• For each arc selected , do:
• If ,  then  the assessment  result  is ; Go 
to the next arc;
• Set the arc flow  and capacity  to zero, 
resulting  in  excess and deficit at its 
tail i and head j;
• Perform  dual pivots until excess/
deficit  is zero or  infeasibility  is 
detected;
• Record pivot history, represented by 
RESULTS OF VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT
STATIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The dams and locks on the Mississippi River 
System  play  a  critical  role in  the corn  export 
supply  cha in .  Thus , we choose s ix 
representative dams and locks for  assessment 
and number  them  from  1  to 6, hiding  their 
actual names in  this document. Since the 
static assessment  model is developed using 
annual freight  volume parameters and 
capacities,  the impact  curves represent  a 
rough estimate of the annual  impact  to total 
supply  chain  cost  due to a disruption. The 
impact  curves are shown in  the left  graph of 
Figure 5.  The right  graph  is the zoomed 
version.
In  Figure 5, since the impact curves of 
Dams No. 5  and 4  are the steepest, the two 
locks are the most  vulnerable. However, 
neither  of the two dominates the other  in 
vulnerability.  By  similar  arguments,  Dam  No. 
1  is the least vulnerable (except  Dam  No. 6). 
The vulnerability  of Dam  No. 1  is close to that 
of Dams No. 5  and 4.  For  Dams No. 2  and 3, 
the two curves intersect.  Dam  No.  3  is more 
vulnerable for  small  disruptions while Dam 
No.  2  is more vulnerable for large 
disruptions.  Due to limited economic  impact, 
Dam  No. 6  is less vulnerable than  the other 
targets, seen  in  the zoomed graph.  As we can 
see, it is a  little counter-intuitive that  the dam 
on  the downstream, which  has more volume 
going  through  it,  is not  always more 
vulnerable.
Figure 5. Static Vulnerability Assessment
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DYNAMIC VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The same selection  of targets is used in 
dynamic  assessment; however,  each  target 
corresponds to a  set  of transportation arcs 
originating  at  different  time periods in  the 
time-space network. The result  is illustrated 
in  Figure 6. The upper  left  graph  shows the 
impact  curves of all selected targets at  all 
time periods; the upper  right  graph  only 
shows the most  vulnerable ones; the  lower 
ones are the zoomed versions of the upper 
right graph.Besides identifying  the most 
vulnerable targets, the dynamic  assessment 
also provides the critical  time for  each  target, 
i.e., the time at which the target is most 
vulnerable. Simply  stated, Dam  No.  5  is most 
vulnerable around week twenty-seven  of the 
year,  since the harvest  peak in its vicinity  is 
around week  twenty-seven.  Dam  No.  4  is 
most  vulnerable around week seventeen. 
Dam  No. 2  is most  vulnerable around week 
forty-five.  Dam  No.  1  does not  appear  in  the 
list  of most vulnerable targets because it  has 
redundant capacity  that  can absorb small 
disruptions.  Dam  No. 3  does not appear  in 
the list,  since there is a  railroad hub nearby 
and there are good alternative routes 
available when the dam is disrupted.
Figure 6. Dynamic Vulnerability Assessment
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CONCLUSION
Based on  the assessments,  the vulnerability 
of a  target  is closely  related to three factors: 
redundancy,  alternative routes,  and time. For 
example,  Dams No. 5  and 4  are the most 
vulnerable among the six targets, because of 
high  utilization and lack of good alternative 
routes.  Dam  No. 3  is less vulnerable than 
Dam  No. 2  because the former one has more 
alternative routes.  Dam  No.  1  is less 
vulnerable because its capacity  is not  fully 
utilized and the slack  capacity  can absorb 
small disruptions.  Dam  No. 6  has a  limited 
impact  if disrupted due to its small capacity 
and good alternative routes. In addition,  the 
time when  the disruption  occurs is also an 
important  factor  for  determining  the 
vulnerability.  If the disruption occurs near 
the peak season  for transportation, the 
economic impact of the disruption is high.
Hence, the following suggestions are given 
to reduce the vulnerability  of the corn  export 
supply  chain: in  the long  run,  decision-
makers need to consider  expanding  the 
capacity  of the critical infrastructure 
components; in  the short  run,  identifying and 
establishing  good alternative (backup) routes 
for  vulnerable routes and making emergency 
plans can  improve the responsiveness of the 
system  and can  reduce the economic loss 
when disruption occurs.
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